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Abstract
The classic dream of moving to a spacious, single-family home in the suburbs has led urban sprawl to 
become the standard pattern of American growth. Unfortunately, this type of growth—in the aggregate— 
has created a vast array of unintended consequences. From increased commuting times and traffic 
congestion to the degradation of ecosystems to the demise of the classic, American “Main Street,” sprawl 
has left its footprint on many facets of the environment and human life. Sprawl’s harms are often periodic 
and delayed, thus it is unlikely that the underlying issues causing and exacerbating the harms will ever 
be addressed. Further, as local governments predominantly regulate land use decisions, municipalities 
rarely, if at all, consider the statewide and regional harms their regulations may create in the aggregate. 
This article presents suggestions for state involvement in local planning and zoning strategies to effectively combat urban
sprawl and its negative effects. In particular, it presents a 
two-step approach for states to implement: (1) adopting 
extensive regulation at a state level, and (2) amending 
existing state grants of power to municipalities and 
prohibiting specific sprawl-inducing mechanisms at a local 
level.
This article proceeds by first analyzing existing American 
zoning law and details how states grant municipalities 
power to regulate local land use and development. It next 
details how this grant of power has led to a widespread 
development pattern known as urban sprawl, and illustrates 
the negative effects it has had on the environment, human 
health and lifestyle.
Sprawl’s effects have not gone unnoticed, as it has 
become a recognized issue in many state legislatures. The 
discussion continues by examining two major state actions 
that have been used to minimize its effects, and describing 
a theory on how a free market approach to land use and 
management could combat sprawl. After analyzing existing 
responses and theories on combatting urban sprawl, 
the concluding paragraphs argue that a combination of 
both extensive regulation at a state level, coupled with 
novel deregulation at a local level, is the best strategy for 
combatting sprawl and its negative effects on humans and 
the environment.
1. INTRODUCTION
“Our laws actively shape our communities and our
landscapes.”1 From its implementation in the early part of
the 20th century, local zoning became and still continues 
to be the dominant model of land use regulation in the
United States.2 These proactive zoning regulations—set
by municipalities—create a template for how future urban
and suburban development will occur.3 The predominate
land use template in the United States widely segregates 
residential, commercial, industrial, and agriculture uses 
and justifies such separation as necessary to protect the 
health, safety, morals, and welfare of a community.4 This 
separation of uses has created a heavy dependence on 
automobiles, however that has led to numerous detrimental 
effects on the environment, humans, and communities.5
This development pattern, known as urban sprawl, 
“consumes thousands of acres of forests and farmland,
woodlands and wetlands requires government to spend
millions extra to build new schools, streets, water and sewer
lines leaves boarded up houses, vacant storefronts__
and traffic congestion stretching miles from urban centers.”6 
What has proved to be “beneficial” at a local level to 
municipalities that set these standards has created extreme 
failings at regional and state levels. Municipalities are not 
required to consider how these development trends might 
affect their surroundings,7 thereby many municipalities 
have continued to enact and enforce zoning regulations 
that promote urban sprawl.
Given the serious consequences, municipal zoning and 
land use regulation must be reformed to combat sprawl and 
its increasingly negative effects. This Article argues that 
states must reclaim some zoning and land use authority 
from municipalities. Municipalities have proven unable to 
effectively mitigate sprawling development patterns both 
because of their limited territorial reach and their reluctance 
to consider the general welfare of the larger regional and 
state community. This article argues that through larger 
intervention at a state level, the general welfare of the larger 
community can be more adequately addressed.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the 
history and structure of zoning in the United States and 
details how municipalities inherited their authority to
zone from the states. Part II introduces urban sprawl, a 
predominant form of American development, and discusses 
the negative effects it creates and exacerbates on the 
environment and human health and lifestyle. Part III first 
analyzes state legislative actions that have been initiated 
with the purpose of curtailing sprawl. It introduces the 
concept of libertarian land use and how its free market 
principles might effectively combat sprawl. Part IV then 
applies the legislative actions and free market concepts 
discussed in Part III to provide a legislative plan (offered 
at two varying degrees of state involvement) for states to 
combat sprawl. The conclusion suggests that more state 
regulation is best suited for deterring sprawl and mitigating 
its effects.
1. AMERICAN ZONING
The predominant method of land use regulation in the 
United States is the local zoning ordinance.8 When the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.9 in 1926, over 400 
municipalities had zoning ordinances in place.10 Today, 
almost every state and major city, with the exception of 
Houston, Texas,11 employs zoning as its principal tool of 
land use regulation.12
The basic structure of Euclidean zoning has changed little 
since its adoption in the 1920s.13 A typical zoning code 
designates various zones or districts, which group and 
separate a municipality into its various uses.14 Within the 
zoning districts are uniform regulations to ensure that similar 
uses are regulated equally.15 These regulations typically 
address types of allowable uses, density of development, 
and allowable size, shape, and character of buildings.16 
Zoning’s ability to proactively regulate the character, shape, 
and feel of a community thus assures property owners as 
to what they and their neighbors will be permitted to do on 
or near their property.17
The authority to regulate private land use and development 
is derived from the police power of the state.18 The police 
power allows the states to exercise their governmental 
power to protect the health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare of its citizens.19 Although the police power is held 
by the states, they have delegated this power to their 
municipalities, thus enabling the municipalities to impose 
land use regulations and restrictions within their territorial 
reach.20
In 1926, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (“SSZEA”), which
provided a common statutory basis for municipalities’ zoning 
power.21 The SSZEA was drafted with careful consideration 
for curing nuisance issues22 prevalent in previous land use 
cases.23 The drafters noted that courts often drew lines 
to establish residential districts, thus protecting them from 
noxious and offending neighboring uses.24 Using this 
concept of segregation of uses, the SSZEA authorized 
municipalities to designate zoning districts whereby only 
compatible uses could be grouped with one another.25 The 
SSZEA recognized a powerful new tool to shape cities: this 
delegation to municipalities allowed them to not only use 
state police power retroactively (abating nuisances that 
were threatening citizen’s health, safety, and welfare) but 
also proactively (preventing future nuisances from occurring 
before they arose).26
Since the SSZEA’s adoption, the majority of states have 
based their zoning enabling legislation upon the model, 
whereby they delegate their police power to municipalities.27 
Zoning enabling acts won quick acceptance and appeal 
nationally and among multiple groups:28 city councils now 
had a new tool to respond to their communities’ requests 
and complaints;29 it appealed to “planners’ innate sense that 
the world would be better if there was ’a place for everything 
and everything in its place;”’30 real estate developers were 
able to build and sell “communities” on sizeable tracts of 
land and turn a large profit;31 and most importantly, zoning 
enabling legislation appealed to citizens who wanted 
to protect their homes and way of life from potential 
nuisances.32
American zoning law has become the most critical and 
formative tool in shaping land development in the last 
century. Although zoning law purports to protect the 
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the community, it has 
unfortunately led to drastic, unintended consequences on 
humans and the environment, which are discussed below.
2. URBAN SPRAWL
While definitions vary, urban sprawl is currently defined as 
low density, automobile dependent development patterns 
created on the edges of urban cores.33 These developments 
following the urban sprawl pattern usually consist of strictly 
separated uses, which essentially “leapfrog” away from 
the city core, thus reducing walkability from destination to 
destination and creating dependence on the automobile.34
This sprawled development pattern has become standard 
in the United States.35 Although the trend toward 
suburbanization began in the nineteenth century, the most
m
rapid expansion of suburban sprawl occurred in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.36 Following World War II, a 
combination of new housing policies37 and the expansion 
of a new interstate highway system38 incentivized people 
to move out of city cores and into surrounding suburban 
areas.39
During this immense growth, Euclidean zoning played 
a major role in the developments’ growth patterns.40 
Euclidean zoning, characterized by a strict separation of 
uses, low-density requirements, and uniform dimensional 
standards, became the template for new urban and 
suburban development.41 Local governments believed the 
intermingling of land uses would have detrimental effects 
on human health and safety;42 therefore, zoning codes 
required a strict segregation of residential, commercial, 
industrial, and agricultural land uses.43 These segregating 
zoning codes “essentially outlawjed]” any mixed-use, 
traditional neighborhood construction,44 thereby creating an 
environment where every activity—whether it be taking the 
dog to the park, going to work, or picking up milk from the 
store— required an additional automobile trip.45
Sprawl’s development patterns have had indirect effects on 
many facets of the American life. With its strict separation of 
uses and low-density developments, urban sprawl requires 
more land than would a denser, traditional neighborhood 
development. With uses separated across a vast surface 
area, sprawling developments lead to two, major effects 
on human activity. First, such developments lead to an 
increased dependence on automobiles and roadway 
infrastructure to get people from point A to point B. Second, 
there is lessened physical activity in humans because the 
walkability in communities is not a major concern.
A. Dependence on Automobiles and Infrastructure
Most obviously, a heavy dependence on personal 
automobiles creates a substantial demand on limited, natural 
resources and significantly contributes to greenhouse gas 
emissions in the atmosphere. The average car uses about 
550 gallons of gasoline and produces about 8,800 pounds 
of carbon dioxide each year.46 SUVs and minivans—which 
currently make up more than half of the vehicle market—burn 
about twice the amount of gasoline and produce about twice 
as much carbon dioxide than their sedan counterparts.47 
These harmful emissions will continue and worsen, barring 
the widespread acceptance of alternative fuels for mobility, 
because sprawl limits peoples’ transportation choices—or 
lack thereof.48
An increased dependence on automobiles goes hand-in- 
hand with an increase in the need for roadway infrastructure 
to carry those vehicles. Billions of taxpayer dollars are 
spent on highway infrastructure every year, and the cost 
only continues to increase as more vehicles drive on the 
road.49
With the large increase in highway spending, it might follow 
that traffic congestion would lessen. On the contrary, the 
number of hours spent sitting in congestion has increased 
significantly.50 Between 2002 and 2012, the number of 
hours vehicular travelers spent sitting in traffic congestion 
increased 19.6%.51
This increase in vehicles and infrastructure also depletes 
one of the most basic natural resources—developable 
land.52 As sprawl continues to encroach on undeveloped 
land, it necessitates additional, environmentally harmful 
infrastructure. Because the average house and lot size 
continue to grow, land consumption rates are increasing 
much faster than population growth.53 The extra mileage 
of water and sewer pipe and road asphalt necessary to 
serve sprawled developments requires far more land and 
resources than compact developments.54
B. Lessened Physical Activity and Walkability
A dependence on cars to get people from place to place 
substitutes for other methods of transport, such as biking 
and walking. Physical activities such as these have many 
positive benefits for the human physical and emotional 
state. Regular physical activity is associated with improved 
quality of life, emotional well-being, and positive mental 
health.55 In addition, physical activity has a well-established 
role in preventing chronic diseases in individuals.58 Chronic 
diseases are costly as related to health but also as related 
to finances.57 Chronic diseases are ranked as four of the 
top five most costly health conditions, with $1.35 trillion 
being spent on health care in 2012.58
Conversely, regular physical activity has been associated 
with lower health care costs.59 To maintain a physically 
active lifestyle, the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services recommends walking as a simple and 
effective strategy.60 The Department has recognized that 
while walking is ultimately a choice made by the individual, 
the decision to walk can be made easier by programs and 
policies that provide those individuals with opportunities 
and encouragement for walking.61
In sum, the rise of sprawl has adverse effects on the
environment, human health, and social and community life. 
States are privy to these aforementioned problems and 
have sought to mitigate these harms in various ways, which 
are explored below.
3. RESPONSES TO SPRAWL
The effects of sprawl have not gone unnoticed, and many 
states have taken statewide regulatory approaches either 
by providing a model land development code or by insisting 
on more consistency in planning.
A. State Intervention as a Means to Control Sprawl
Traditional zoning law enables local governments to 
prescribe land use decisions with which states have 
traditionally chosen not to interfere.62 Unfortunately, this 
delegation of authority to local governments has become 
one of the fundamental causes of sprawl.63 For example, 
policies on transportation, economic development, and 
environmental protection are generally regulated at a 
statewide level, yet many municipalities’ land use regulations 
have a major effect on these policies.64 Even to the extent 
that “[ejach locality may be acting rationally with respect to 
its own self-interest,” the aggregate of all of these localities 
implementing similar sprawl-inducing regulations leads to 
larger statewide and regional problems.65
To preserve its agricultural and tropical land and heritage 
from the state’s rapid pace of urban development, Hawaii 
was the first state to implement a statewide land use planning 
system in 1961.6e Since then, several other states have 
adopted their own comprehensive systems of statewide 
planning for growth management.67 Most significant among 
them are Vermont, Florida, and Oregon, whose programs 
shifted considerable regulatory power back to the state or 
regional level.68
Both Vermont’s and Florida’s statewide planning statutes 
share similar characteristics. Both statutes are historically 
related to the American Law Institute’s Model Land 
Development Code (“MLDC”).69 The MLDC approach shifts 
authority away from localities by requiring regional or state 
approval for all major development projects and areas of 
critical concern.70
In the 1960’s, Vermont experienced widespread resort 
development that drastically increased land values and 
threatened the state’s traditionally pastoral landscape.71 In 
response to these threats, the state enacted the Vermont 
State Land Use and Development Act of 1970 (“Act 250”).72 
Act 250 requires that all public and private developments
involving ten or more acres and all residential developments 
involving ten or more units obtain a permit from the relevant 
regional Environmental District Commission (“EDC”).73 
The EDC, acting as a regional control, may deny the 
development a permit if the development is “detrimental to 
the public health, safety or general welfare.”74
By 1972, Florida was facing extreme population pressures,75 
an extreme drought,76 and a growing environmental 
movement.77 To address these concerns, the state enacted 
the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act 
of 1972 ("ELWMA”).78 Like Act 250, ELWMA provided for the 
regional regulation of development, but it maintained a much 
higher threshold of review for proposed developments. 79 
ELWMA compelled regional regulation of any “development 
of regional impact” (“DRI”).80
A DRI is defined as “any development, which because 
of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a 
substantial effect upon the health, safety, and welfare 
of citizens of more than one county.”81 If a proposed 
development qualifies as a DRI, the developer must file an 
application with the relevant municipality,62 and it will hold 
a public hearing.83 Before the public hearing, the relevant 
regional planning agency will prepare a report and any 
recommendations on the regional impact of the proposed 
development for the municipality.84 After the public hearing, 
the municipality may approve, deny, or approve subject 
to conditions, restrictions, or limitations on the proposed 
development.85 In making its decision, the municipality 
considers whether the proposed development is consistent 
with the local comprehensive plan and land use regulations, 
whether the proposed development is consistent with the 
regional planning agency’s report and recommendations, 
and whether the proposed development is consistent with 
the State Comprehensive Plan.86 While the municipality is 
granted extensive authority to regulate DRIs, its decision 
is still subject to review by the state land planning agency, 
which may appeal the municipality’s decision to the Florida 
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission.87
Although Florida and Vermont both aligned their statewide 
land development goals with the objectives of the MLDC,88 
they both eventually adopted many principles established 
by the planning consistency approach discussed below.89
In reaction to population pressures, rapid development, 
and an interest in protecting its natural resources, Oregon 
adopted the Oregon State Land Use Act90 in 1973.91 Unlike
the MLDC approach, which relied on direct state and 
regional regulation of major projects and critical areas, the 
planning consistency approach relies on state oversight of 
local planning and zoning regulations.92
In the mid 1980’s, both Florida93 and Vermont94 implemented 
considerations from Oregon’s planning consistency 
approach into their land use planning statutes by adding 
provisions for municipalities to enact comprehensive plans 
consistent with statewide policies and goals. Since then, 
six other states95 have formulated some type of review 
process, which encourages consistency between state and 
local governments, compatibility among plans of adjoining 
jurisdictions, and consistency among plans and regulations 
within jurisdictions.96
The Oregon State Land Use Act provides for a seven- 
member Land Conservation and Development Commission 
(“LCDC”).97 The LCDC is required to adopt, and given the 
authority to revise, statewide land use planning goals.98 
Municipalities must then create comprehensive land 
use plans that comply with the LCDC’s adopted goals." 
Additionally, any regulations and zoning ordinances 
created by the municipality must comply with the LCDC’s 
adopted goals.100 The LCDC is responsible for reviewing 
and enforcing the municipalities’ plans and regulations for 
consistency with statewide goals.101
The existing 19 goals adopted by the LCDC generally fall into 
five categories:102 the planning process,103 resource lands 
protection,104 human interaction with the environment,105 
urbanization,106 and goals relating to special areas.107 Of 
these goals, the most notable is Goal 14, Urbanization.1"
Goal 14 provides for “an orderly and efficient transition from 
rural to urban land use, to accommodate urban population 
and urban employment inside urban growth boundaries, 
to ensure efficient use of land and to provide for livable 
communities.”109 To satisfy this goal, the LCDC requires 
that municipalities establish and maintain urban growth 
boundaries.110 Urban growth boundaries distinguish 
“urban and urbanizable land” from “rural land” and define 
a line beyond which development may not occur.111 This 
segregation encourages compact development by requiring 
that a municipality not permit development on more lands 
than it needs for future growth.112
Inside the urban growth boundary, a municipality must 
accommodate housing needs for residents of all income 
levels and provide for the municipality’s economic
development by making available adequate amounts of 
land for commercial and industrial uses.113 Municipalities 
with a population greater than 2,500 must additionally create 
a public facility plan ensuring that adequate transportation 
and utilities are available for all developments within the 
urban growth boundary.114 Oregon’s urban growth boundary 
system has generally been successful at increasing the 
availability of land for multifamily housing, commercial, and 
industrial uses, while still ensuring that almost all of all new 
development occurs within the urban growth boundary.115
Outside of the urban growth boundary, the main focus of 
Goal 14 is the preservation of existing natural resources 
and rural industries, primarily farming and forestry.116 
Oregon’s urban growth boundary system has also been 
largely successful at preserving the state’s farmlands and 
forests. In addition, Oregon farms have become more 
economically successful than farms in neighboring states, 
such as Washington.117
B. Libertarian Land Use as a Means to Control Sprawl
A radically different approach to state intervention, 
commonly referred to as “libertarian land use,” argues that 
municipalities and states should deregulate many common 
land use controls to reduce sprawl.118 After a brief review 
of the free market concept of libertarian land use, the case 
of Houston, Texas’s application of libertarian land use 
concepts is presented to show how free market principles 
have not been entirely realized.
As with the political philosophy, the term “libertarian” implies 
antagonistic attitudes towards governmental controls that 
limit peoples’ freedoms. As such, libertarian land use is 
critical of zoning ordinances that restrict property owners’ 
freedoms to use, develop, and sell their properties as they 
see fit.119
Libertarian land use not only views zoning ordinances 
as “a violation of property rights” as a “taking” under the 
Constitution but also as an arbitrary and inefficient means 
of regulating land use.120 Because the government has 
no means of rational economic calculation of people’s 
preferences when imposing zoning ordinances, the 
government cannot weigh the appropriate pros and cons of 
the restrictions it establishes.121 This becomes increasingly 
problematic as governments must address and adapt to 
community changes, such as population and demographic 
shifts, without adequate resources to make informed 
decisions.122 Government control over land use may also
lead to an abuse of discretionary power, with government 
officials’ decisions being primarily motivated by job security 
and political popularity123 rather than local need.124
Libertarian land use asserts that a person who has legally 
acquired property should rightly be able to use his or her 
property in any way that does not intrude upon the property 
rights of others.125 Libertarian land use principles rely 
on traditional property and contract law to address the 
problems that zoning ordinances preemptively attempt to 
solve.126
Perhaps the most notable mechanism of controlling land 
use without governmental interference is the restrictive 
covenant. Restrictive covenants may restrict the same sort 
of activities as a zoning ordinance rather than affecting the 
entire municipality; however, the restrictive covenant only 
affects the desires of the agreeing parties.127 Restrictive 
covenants act as a form of “voluntary zoning,” where 
agreeing parties may be used to control common NIMBY128 
fears such as skyscrapers in the suburbs or strip clubs next 
to schools.129
Libertarian land use sees restrictive covenants as “a device 
of the market to maximize the value of property.”130 Unlike 
a municipality, which has no objective means of economic 
calculation when enacting land use restrictions, a private 
property owner holds a stake in the market and is capable of 
weighing the pros and cons of placing land use restrictions 
on the property.131 Here, a property owner can weigh the 
benefit of owning an enforceable, restrictive covenant over 
his or her neighbor’s property against the disadvantage the 
restriction would have on the use of his or her property and 
subsequently, any detriment the restriction would have on 
the market value of the property.132 Restrictive covenants 
allow property and covenant owners, who have personal 
and intimate knowledge of local conditions, to propose and 
enforce their agreed-upon restrictions. These restrictions 
are motivated by the owners’ desire to improve the 
property and its market value, unlike restrictions in zoning 
ordinances, which are preemptively decided by government 
official’s discretionary power.133
Houston is often cited as a living example of libertarian land 
use134 as it is the only American city without a formal zoning 
code.135 Because Houston refuses to adopt a zoning 
code, many believe that Houston’s land use regulation is 
“extremely modest when compared to what is contained in 
most zoning ordinances.”136 Thus, when Houston is cited
as one of the most congested,137 automobile dependent,138 
and sprawled cities,139 there is understandable concern 
that a free market, libertarian land use approach would 
do nothing to combat the effects of urban sprawl.140 This 
concern might be a valid one if Houston’s land use was 
one that was completely deregulated. The city’s land use is 
regulated, however, in ways that are generally similar to any 
other American city.141
Houston’s lack of a formal zoning code does not provide 
the free market opportunities142 promised by a libertarian 
land use approach. Although Houston does not have a 
restriction explicitly prohibiting the mixing of residential 
and commercial uses,143 it still maintains other sprawl- 
inducing development regulations,144 such as minimum lot 
sizes,145 minimum parking requirements,146 and setback 
requirements.147
Houston’s deregulation of use restrictions may be the only 
libertarian land use principle evoked by the “free market” 
image of the city. Like libertarian land use principles 
advocate,148 use designations are developed through 
the adoption and enforcement of restrictive covenants.149 
Even the restrictive covenants in Houston are “so heavily 
facilitated by government involvement that they resemble 
zoning.”150 Houston city code allows the city attorney to 
enforce restrictive covenants, where the city may seek 
civil penalties of up to $1,000 per day for the violation of a 
covenant.151 In its covenant enforcement, “the city focuses 
on enforcement of use restrictions (that is, covenant 
provisions requiring separation of uses), as opposed to 
enforcement of other restrictions such as aesthetic rules.”152 
These enforcement actions thus force Houston taxpayers 
to subsidize the enforcement of restrictive covenants that 
segregate land uses and promote sprawled development.153
4. SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR INCORPORATING 
LIBERTARIAN LAND USE INTO STATE INTERVENTION
Land is a precious and scarce natural resource. It should 
be utilized to best provide for the needs and desires of the 
people. This will occur to the most optimum degree if the 
use and development of the land is left to the private market 
place except in those instances when the government has a 
vital and pressing need to impose regulation,154
This Part suggests that the juxtaposition of extensive 
regulation at a statewide level and minimal regulation at a 
local level will be the most effective means of combatting 
urban sprawl. The proposal is that states adopt legislation 
requiring implementation of urban growth boundaries and
state zoning enabling acts that require municipal zoning 
should amend their acts to no longer require the adoption 
and enforcement of municipal regulation. A more extreme 
approach suggests that states amend their zoning enabling 
legislation and enact complementing legislations that 
specifically prohibit municipalities from enacting ordinances 
known to promote sprawl.
The authority to implement an urban growth boundary 
requires state legislative action.155 This legislation should first 
require that each municipality of a certain size or population 
within the state adopt an urban growth boundary as part of 
its comprehensive plan. As the municipalities develop their 
individual comprehensive plans, the state legislation should 
additionally encourage156—or alternatively, require157—that 
municipalities collaborate with one another to ensure a 
uniform framework for planning actions.
The state legislative action should additionally include 
relevant factors, which help to justify the municipalities’ 
decisions on where to draw their urban growth boundaries. 
These factors might include existing and projected 
population figures, the cost of extending infrastructure to 
specific areas, existing public facilities, and existing open 
space and reserve land.
Continuing state involvement with urban growth boundaries 
should be minimally intrusive on municipality decisions. 
State involvement should be limited to three responsibilities. 
First, the state should oversee municipalities’ compliance 
with the legislative action, thus ensuring that all municipalities 
have created and adopted a comprehensive plan and urban 
growth boundary. Second, whenever a municipality wishes 
to expand its urban growth boundary, the state should have 
the right to appeal the municipality’s decision if it believes 
the expansion is unnecessary or inappropriate. Lastly, 
the state should be responsible for resolving any disputes 
between multiple municipalities regarding urban growth 
boundaries.
One approach is to eliminate requirements from the state 
enabling acts that require that municipalities zone. Another 
approach would reach all state enabling legislation, not just 
ones that require municipalities to create zoning ordinances, 
by removing municipalities’ authority to regulate specific 
zoning controls that promote sprawl.
Although every state has some form of zoning enabling 
legislation, some states specifically require that 
municipalities adopt and enforce zoning ordinances.158 The
proposal suggests that those states amend their zoning 
enabling legislation to merely grant municipalities zone 
authority rather than explicitly require them to zone.
This approach will likely only lead to minimal change,159 
however and the suggestion would only affect a small 
number of states.160 Further, in states where municipal 
zoning is optional, the vast majority of municipalities in 
those states continue to enact and enforce sprawl-inducing 
legislation. A more extreme and directed approach to state 
intervention and deregulation at a municipal level to more 
effectively sprawl’s effects would suggest that states amend 
their zoning enabling acts to limit municipalities’ police 
power to only regulations that do not conflict with state 
regulations, restrictions, or goals. After that states should 
enact legislation to prohibit municipalities from adopting 
sprawl-inducing regulations.
Because municipalities’ power to regulate land use is 
dependent on the state’s grant of authority,161 the state has 
the ability, a fortiori, to amend its zoning enabling act to 
restrict municipalities’ authority to enforce its police power. 
By simply amending a typical state zoning enabling act 
to include an additional restriction that municipalities may 
adopt any regulation purposed for promoting the health, 
safety, morals, or welfare of the community so long as there 
are no other superseding state regulations or restrictions, 
states can ensure their authority to prohibit sprawl-inducing 
ordinances proposed by municipalities.162 Using Section 1 
of the SSZEAas an example of how a state zoning enabling 
act could be amended to provide for state restrictions on 
municipalities, such amendment could read as follows:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, 
morals, or the general welfare of the community, 
local legislative body of cities and incorporated 
villages is hereby empowered to regulate and 
restrict [subject to any superseding regulations and 
restrictions promulgated by the state government 
or any agency or subdivision thereof], the height, 
number of stories, and size of buildings and other 
structures, the percentage of lot that may be 
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open 
spaces, the density of population, and the location 
and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, 
industry, residence, or other purposes.163
By adding this simple phrase to a state's zoning enabling 
act, the state government can guarantee municipalities’
zoning ordinances will comply with state goals of combatting 
sprawl.164 Municipalities will thus retain the authority to 
regulate local land use decisions affecting the specific needs 
of their communities, but states will reclaim the authority to 
supersede sprawl-inducing regulations known to be harmful 
at regional and statewide levels.165
After amending its zoning enabling act to allow for the 
intervention of municipalities’ granted police power, the 
state can develop additional legislation that prohibit 
municipalities from developing ordinances that promote 
sprawled development patterns. This state prohibition of 
specific municipal ordinances to promote statewide goals 
has already been implemented in a number of states.166
This suggests that states adopt specific legislations 
prohibiting municipalities from adopting the three most 
sprawl-inducing regulations: (1) single use zoning, (2) 
parking minimums, and (3) density restrictions.
First, states should enact legislations prohibiting 
municipalities from creating zoning ordinances that restrict 
mixed-use developments in residential and commercial 
zoning districts. Mixed-use developments are a blend of 
residential, commercial, cultural, and institution uses.167 
These developments are closely linked, thus increasing 
density and reducing the need for transportation.166 As 
previously mentioned,169 typical zoning codes generally 
mandate a strict separation of uses. This system of single 
use zoning increases the likelihood that people will not live 
near work, recreation, or shopping.170
While a number of municipalities have created specific 
"mixed-use” zoning districts,171 they are still segregated from 
the traditional residential and commercial zoning districts. 
Thus, unless one lives in or close to a mixed-use district, 
he or she is still forced to drive to a mixed-use development 
zoned in a mixed-use district to take advantage of its 
benefits.
If states were to enact legislation that prohibited 
municipalities from restricting mixed-use developments in 
both residential and commercial zoning districts, mixed-use 
developments would have more opportunities to develop 
in other areas, thus affording those living and working in 
residential and commercial districts the opportunity to walk 
or bike to nearby shops, housing, offices, and restaurants. 
Such legislation could read as follows: “The adoption of 
an ordinance by a governing body, which prohibits or has 
the effect of prohibiting the development of residential,
commercial, mixed-use buildings and properties is 
expressly prohibited.” As written, this type of legislation 
would still allow municipalities to restrict industrial uses 
(one of the most cited reasons for separation of uses172) 
from interfering with residential and commercial properties. 
The legislation would simply afford residents the chance to 
visit small-scale shopping, work, and recreation without the 
necessity of getting in the car.
States should also enact legislation prohibiting 
municipalities from mandating parking minimums. It is 
commonplace for municipalities to require landowners to 
provide their customers, visitors, and guests with ample off- 
street parking,173 typically requiring commercial properties 
to devote more than half of their land to parking stalls.174 
When regulations force landowners to use valuable square 
footage for parking, it lessens available space for housing or 
other businesses. This creates two problems: (1) it further 
spreads out destinations, thus making it more difficult 
to develop pedestrian-friendly environments; and (2) it 
artificially subsidizes driving.175 When most destinations 
provide a guaranteed parking space at no cost, it makes 
driving more attractive than other forms of transportation,176 
such as walking, biking, or public transportation.177
States should thus enact legislation that prohibits 
municipalities from creating zoning ordinances that 
require parking minimums. Such legislation could read 
as follows: “The adoption of an ordinance by a governing 
body, which requires or incentivizes a minimum number of 
off-street parking stalls is expressly prohibited.” This sort 
of deregulation would enhance landowners’ freedoms by 
giving them the right to determine how much parking is 
necessary on their land and whether to charge for it. This 
free market approach allows landowners to weigh the value 
of adding buildable square footage against the benefits of 
providing their customers, tenants, and guests with a free— 
or now chargeable—parking spaces. With deregulation 
of parking minimums, the government would artificially 
decrease the supply of parking, thus increasing the market 
price of parking.178 With an increased market price, the 
demand for parking should decrease, thus decreasing 
driving and increasing alternative forms of transportation, 
such as walking, biking, and public transportation.179
Lastly, states should enact legislation that prohibits 
municipalities from placing density thresholds on residential 
properties. Historically, municipalities have sought to limit 
population densities by requiring that properties, particularly
residences, consume large amounts of land.180 These 
density regulations thus create sprawled developments, 
which in turn, create a dependency on automobiles and 
reduce walkablllty.181
If states did not allow municipalities to set minimum 
density regulations for properties in residential zones, then 
landowners would have the freedom to build more units on 
less land, thus increasing the number of destinations one 
could reach on foot. Legislation for this type of deregulation 
could be written as follows: “The adoption of an ordinance 
by a governing body, which requires that residences be built 
on a minimum lot or parcel size is expressly prohibited.” 
As written, this deregulation still allows for market choice: 
those who wish to continue to live in low-density housing 
can still purchase such homes. This sort of deregulation 
simply affords landowners the opportunity to build more 
diverse types of living, thus allowing those who wish to live 
in more walkable, compact spaces the opportunity to do so.
In sum, state legislative acts that prohibit municipalities from 
prohibiting mixed-use developments and implementing 
parking minimums and density restrictions will likely give 
landowners more freedom to develop more mixed, compact 
development and allow strategic infill developments on 
existing tracts of land. This freedom to develop, coupled 
with the implementation of urban growth boundaries 
discussed in Part IV. allows new and existing developments 
“to grow in and up, not out,” which is the aim of urban growth 
boundaries as well as the aim of curtailing urban sprawl.182
5. CONCLUSION
The detrimental effects urban sprawl has had on the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare of communities require major 
reform in current land use policies. State intervention 
to (1) limit horizontal development through urban 
growth boundaries, and (2) enable otherwise restricted 
developments through amendments to zoning enabling 
acts provides a strategy for curtailing harmful developments 
while still enabling novel growth.
Hopefully, through this two-step, state action approach, land 
owners and developers can provide communities with mixed- 
use, connected developments, thus reducing automobile 
dependence and managing sprawl’s detrimental effects. 
More land can be dedicated to habitat and ecosystem 
conservation through the protections afforded by urban 
growth boundaries; fewer automobiles on the road can 
limit greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions; pedestrian- 
friendly environments can enhance peoples’ everyday way
of life by reducing commuter frustrations, promoting social 
interactions, and providing a sense of autonomy to those 
unable to drive.
The little-changed land use policies adopted in the early 20th 
century must be adapted to address one of this generation’s 
most pressing issues. With state action shaping how 
municipalities can regulate (and not regulate) land use 
and development, urban sprawl might be hindered and its 
effects minimized.
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